Jovanovic’s & Panathinaikos’ Success Explained: Exploiting Naive Pressing Structures
Panathinaikos leads the Greek Superleague table undefeated, with 12 wins and 1 draw before the World Cup break. After a season of ups and downs in terms of results in 2021/2022, the team found the much needed stability and confidence to challenge for the title and are the undeniable favourites as we enter the second part of the season.
Ivan Jovanovic’s side started to perform like a contender at the middle of the 2021/22 season, at the end of the first month of 2022. At that time, a major tactical shift from Jovanivc reached its first 10-game period. In terms of results Panathinaikos was struggling to secure its place in the top 4, with a disappointing record away from home during that period. But it was clear both from the newly established tactical process and the underlying numbers that the process was right and the ceiling quite high.
With minor tactical differences compared to 2021/22 (more aided by the slightly different personnel) Ivan Jovanovic in his second season at the club has maximised the potential of his squad and overperformed the club’s resources compared to the competitors. In this piece we’ll explore the tactical reasons behind the renaissance of the team, exploring not only what Panathinaikos tries to achieve on the pitch, but also why it works perfectly in the specific context the team operates in.
The 3–2–5/3–1–6 and the “elbow back”
Panathinaikos’ current tactical setup has been used since the late November of 2021. Since then, the team has made its attacking structure more rigid, with less moving parts and has boosted the relationships between the different attacking sub-groups that have grown more comfortable in performing highly repetitive actions in similar spaces. This stability in Panathinaikos’ structure has resulted in more and longer possession sequences. The objective behind it was not only to attack better, but also to have more control on the tempo with slower possessions and better defensive access once possession is lost in the opposition half.
In order to achieve the said control, Jovanovic started using his right-back in the 4–2–3–1 as an elbow back, sitting at the right halfspace and creating a back3 with the two centre backs. This way he created a +1 in the first line, whilst keeping the two defensive midfielders centrally to pin the opposition frontline with their movement. The two ball-oriented midfielders that the club had last season in Villafanez & Ruben Perez would also drop deep to ask for the ball, meaning that there was always safe possession and passing options in the build-up, albeit at the cost of reduced presence in the second line.
The 3–2–5 could change to 3–1–6 with the midfielder next to the #6 (Ruben Perez) pushing into the space between the lines. This is a situation that occurs more this season with the newcomer Slovenian Adam Cerin being more flexible tactically with his movement and anticipation than his predecessor.
To achieve width in the final third, Jovanovic used different dynamics from the left to right side. We already mentioned the right back, sitting deep in possession and working in tandem with the two centre backs and the holding midfielder. On the other side, the left back would push high to the last line looking to receive passes in behind and over the top of the defence, while the left winger would invert inside and operate between the lines, often dropping deeper to support (or pull a defender to create space for the fullback).
On the right side the winger would play on the chalk, at times rotating with the #10 who would occupy a similar space with the left winger (on the halfspace) but could rotate much more often with the right winger, in the most fluid cooperation on the pitch for the team (although as the #8-Cerin becomes more comfortable in his role, the spaces occupied by the #8 and the LW are increasingly more fluid this season).
This 3–2–5 / 3–1–6 possession setup with an elbow back, would come to expose the Greek Superleague’s tactical deficiencies regarding the, as I call, “naive pressing structures” of the mid/low table.
THE “NAIVE” PRESSING STRUCTURES
The 3–2–5/3–1–6 type positional structures are one of the most common, used by many teams in lots of leagues — especially teams that sit high in the table and are expected to face low blocks in the vast majority of their games. The efficiency of this structure and the limited variability in the positioning of Panathinaikos, regardless of the opposition, lies heavily in the specific context of the league. The success lies not only at the structure itself, but the way it’s formed; which player/position is occupying its space on the pitch.
Given that most blocks in the Greek Superleague are centred around a 4–4–2, what I define as “naive pressing structures” are those that use:
- zonal responsibilities in the backline and the two defensive midfielders,
- player-oriented marking at the wide midfielders/wingers. The defensive positioning/orientation of those players is more oriented towards the opposition fullbacks and rarely work together with the two defensive midfielders. They don’t shift from side to side to close the centre and force the opposition wide; they mainly stay tight to the fullback and prevent a switch of play
- the front two, often in a 1–1 staggering with one player pressing the centre backs and the other often not shadowing the #6 and then jumping onto the centre-backs at the right moments, but sitting in the #6 the majority of the time in a player-marking fashion.
Another common theme is a player-marking striker in a 4–1–4–1 that uses pressing jumps from the ball-near central midfielder into the centre-back.
The way the responsibilities are usually split between the defensive, the midfield and the attacking “line” results first of all in reduced horizontal coverage in the midfield, with two midfielders having too much ground to cover when the attack moves the ball quickly from one side to the other. The winger’s player-oriented positioning allows them to put immediate pressure on the fullbacks when they receive deep, but their static positioning creates a dynamic advantage for the fullbacks. When the right back receives deep, he can break the press with a quick give & go to the touchline hugging winger. From the left side, the high and wide left back is always one step ahead when it comes to runs in behind the defensive line.
Before this tactical adjustment from Jovanovic, these pressing structures were harder to break down by the top teams in the league partly because of the way they utilised their fullbacks. Most teams used their fullbacks symmetrically, high and wide in the opposition half dragging the opposition wingers with them and creating a situational 6–2–2 structure for the opposition, deep in their own half.
This movement allowed them to pin the opposition in the last part of the pitch, with 6+2 players defending outside the box. But it also made the effective playing pitch smaller — reducing the available spaces to only in front of the shape; there is no space to play in behind as the opposition sets deep, no spaces around the shape as the wingers track the wide players really deep and the lack of ball-carrying centre-backs and overall skill in 1v1 situations for most teams, makes it hard for the attacking team to invite a defender and imbalance the block by beating a defender in 1v1.
Jovanovic’s asymmetrical use of the fullbacks doesn’t fall into this trap. We can see in these examples from this season’s Greek Superleague how Jovanovic’s structure manipulates opposition defensive blocks — achieving exactly what a more traditional “fullbacks high and wide and wingers inside” guideline would, but with the asymmetry having extra benefits.
From the left, the left back pushes high and wide dragging the winger with him — creating a situational back5 for the opponent. The back3 in the build-up allows the left centre back to carry into the space created by the fullback or the left central midfielder to drop into that space to progress the ball.
As the fullback occupies the width, the left winger has more freedom to roam horizontally between the lines, offer to receive, combine and create superiorities. Opposite movements between the left fullback and the left winger (winger shows deeper — fullback makes a run in behind) create positional and communication breakdowns between their opposition opposite numbers, combined with the dynamical advantage of the fullback’s off-ball run.
From the right, the deep position of the fullback has multiple effects apart from the numerical superiority in the first line.
The starting position of the opposition left winger (oriented towards the elbow back) and the central presence (LW and #10 between the lines) that the two defensive midfielders have to cover, forces the left back to step out wide when the touchline-hugging RW receives isolated from the fullback. When that pressing jump happens:
- the #10 can attack the space between the LB and the LCB to have a 1v1 against a centre-back.
- The elbow back can make an underlapping run (dynamical advantage against his marker once he plays a pass out wide) and create another passing option centrally when the #10 makes an out to in run.
Another effect of the back3 formed with the right back is that it allows the defensive midfielder (#6) to stay centrally and always offer a relay option from side to side to switch play and change the point of attack, while the opposition front two always have to direct their press in order to cover the passing lane towards him. When/if the #6 receives in the centre-circle behind the opposition first line, the reduced central coverage of the “naive pressing structures” we mentioned earlier can’t cover the passing options that the structure provides efficiently (wide runners — hold-up #9 — receivers between the lines) nor put enough pressure to limit the #6’s space and time on ball.
CONCLUSION & REST DEFENSE BENEFITS
This setup used by Ivan Jovanovic has enabled his team to invite pressure and attack space dynamically and pin the opposition back to sustain pressure at the same time. The back3 and the #6 can keep a stable 3+1 or 1+3 rest defensive structure. The almost constant numerical superiority against the opposition frontline, allows the #6 to join the counterpress aggressively when the ball is lost in the opposition half, while the back3 can vary its responsibilities. Each of the three can man-mark opposition dropping movements, with at least one — often two defenders covering the space in behind.
