Tactical Analysis: Greece — Kosovo 1:1

In ninety sterile productively minutes from either side, Kosovo saved the day with a late-equaliser.

Greece set up in a 5–3–2, in John van Schip’s recent attempts to make space for both Tsimikas and Giannoulis -gifted left backs- in the starting lineup, with a deep line of engagement and no intention to risk playing out from the back. Kosovo opted for a 4–3–3 and attacked from wide areas, with little to no interest in penetrating from the centre.

Starting Lineups (Kosovo — Greece 1:1, September 5)

Kosovo build-out through fullbacks , Greece left halfspace issues.

The Kosovars utilized their right back in a back-4 circulation to draw pressure from Greece’s wide central midfielder and play through or over the top to an overloaded right side with the RCM, the RW and the striker, Muriqi. Siopis’ (Greece’s left central midfielder) timing and pace when stepping out to Vojvoda, while keeping players between the lines in his cover shadow, forced Kosovo backwards and to try to advance from the left side with a right footed left-back. At the same time, Greece’s back 5 system allowed them to become player-oriented in the wide areas with Giannoulis (LCB) and Tzavellas (CCB), following Halimi (RCM) and Muriqi (ST) between the lines and into the space behind, respectively.

Kosovo’s attack from wide areas vs Greece’s 5–3–2

On the defensive side, Kosovo pressed in a 4–3–3 -higher than Greece did- creating a 3v3 relation vs Greece’s centre-backs and forcing them to long balls towards Douvikas. When Greece started their possessions higher up the pitch, the back-3 remained against Kosovo’s 4–1–4–1 defensive block and with two left-footed CBs in Tzavellas and Giannoulis they seeked to find progression through the left halfspace, rotating from a 3–5–2 to a 3-box-3ish formation with Bakasetas (RCM) moving higher to the right halfspace and Pavlidis (LS) dropping deeper to the left.

Greece’s struggles in possession were a combination of lack of variety and situational awareness. The 3-box-3 idea was good to create a 4v3 between the lines versus Kosovo’s three highly player-oriented midfielders (same principle was applied in their latest meet in October 2020), but when Pavlidis couldn’t drop into the left halfspace, the two central midfielders (Bouchalakis & Siopis) stayed far too centrally leaving no passing options between the lines to the back-3. This lack of variety in Greece’s possession game was enhanced by Kosovo’s defensive setup: the player-orientation against Siopis, Bouchalakis and Bakasetas (from the #6, when the ball moved centrally) along with the high and narrow positioning of the ball-far (usually left) winger made Greece’s build-up lopsided and predictable.

Greece 3-box-3 formation vs Kosovo’s 4–1–4–1

There are a lot of things Greece could have done within the back-3 formation to pose different problems to the opposition’s narrow 4–1–4–1 turned 4–3–3 defensive setup. A more basic one would be to use their wingbacks more in the build-up process in order to attract pressure from Kosovo’s fullbacks and unbalance the defense, but they weren’t willing to play through the press.

The 1st halftime ended with Greece taking the lead after a micro-transition situation following a deep free kick clearance from Kosovo, with Bakasetas collecting a second ball and playing a well-weighted through ball to the 22-year old striker, Douvikas, to finish in a 1v1 situation against Muric.

Greece engages higher with lack of compactness and can’t retain possession

The second half started with a substitution from Kosovo; Bytiqi came in for Kastrati and played at the left wing, while Rashica moved to the right. Greece engaged higher defensively in 3–5–2 and later in a more of a 3–4–1–2 / 3–4–2–1 with Bakasetas moving more centrally to press from behind the lone defensive midfielder (Dresevic). The front two closed the lanes to the centre and Tsimikas stepped out aggressively to Kosovo’s deep right back, Vojvoda, forcing the build-up to their less-effective left side.

Kosovo build-up forced to the left (Tsimikas high positioning | 3–4–1–2 press)

Kosovo was surprisingly committed to starting attacks from the back and tried to find a solution to Greece’s press by creating an asymmetrical 4–2 (instead of 4–1) scheme with Berisha (LCM) dropping deeper, next to Dresevic. Greece still managed to keep their opponents away from their half of the pitch and recover balls in dangerous areas, but they failed to convert these situations into shots and secure their lead.

Kosovo creates a 4v3 — Greece’s 3–4–1–2 & 3–5–2 high press

The 2–1 shape of the Greek frontline could be seen more after the 60th minute, after Kosovo’s adjustments and since Mantalos (attacking midfielder) came in for Douvikas. The 3–4–2–1 shape was retained when Greece defended deeper, compared to the successful use of the 3–5–2 in the first half.

Greece’s 3–4–2–1 defensive block in the 2nd HT

However, Greece’s defensive organisation lacked vertical compactness, as the Greek defenders were afraid of the space behind them and the runs made by Kosovo’s forward line, and the distances within the shape were huge. This issue became more prominent as the time passed, Kosovo started launching more long balls from the back and the running distances for the Greek wingbacks and midfielders were just too large to cover sequence by sequence. Even when Greece could recover the second ball, they were disconnected and tired, so they couldn’t transition smoothly into attacking positions and retain possession.

Kosovo’s direct attacks and crossing load eventually paid off with another injury time goal in this game. It was another micro-transition situation after Greece failed to retain possession after a deep throw-in (hey, throw-ins might be important!). Kosovo recovered, switched the ball to the weak side and Bytyqi put a far-post cross for Muriqi to convert from the 6-yard box, after Hadergjonaj’s headed assist.

Conclusion

Greece’s strategy in the first half was good enough to nullify Kosovo’s limited attacking threats and they had the luck to score with their first actual chance before the break. The choice to increase their pressing intensity and engage higher in the second half against a Kosovo side that was unlikely to find successful pathways against a low block didn’t turn out well for John Van Schip. The lack of dribblers in the squad and defensive midfield reinforcements from the bench didn’t help to keep up that intensity and secure the lead with a second goal on the counter.

On the other side, it would be unfair for Kosovo to miss the draw against a side that didn’t do much more than they did to win the game. The 4–1–4–1 made it hard for the Mavropanos, Giannoulis and Tzavellas to find pathways between the lines and their cross-heavy approach to target-man Muriqi gave them another point after the 1–0 win against Georgia.