Tactical Preview: Olympiacos vs Fenerbahce
OLYMPIACOS | José Luis Mendilibar
by Petros Kariatoglou (@PKariatoglou)
Olympiacos reached the quarter finals after an impressive 1–6 comeback win, from a 1–4 loss in the first game against Maccabi Tel Aviv. Two results that depict the team’s low floor — high ceiling current status and their lack of emotional and therefore structural stability within games. Their third manager in the season, Europa League winner Jose Luis Mendilibar, took charge in February and has mainly focused on instilling a more aggressive (and super demanding tactically) out of possession behaviour, while getting the best of the players skillset in a more simplified and fluid style of play in possession in their 4–2–3–1 starting structure.
OLYMPIACOS | Out of Possession
Lining up in a 4–4–1–1 out of possession, Olympiacos likes to press high from goal kicks and use the striker to force play one side and the attacking midfielder to close central options and force play out wide. Mendilibar often tends to defend 1v1 in these dead ball moments, using his winger to press the outside passes to the centre-back and a fullback to fullback press, or maintain a +1 on the defensive line or midfield, while leaving the far-side fullback free. Against opponents that struggle to adapt against high pressing structures, Olympiacos can force balls into midfield where their mobile and good technically CMs can win second balls and restart attacks.
What the team has struggled to grasp more evidently in Mendilibar’s out of possession strategy is the transitions between pressing directly all the way and committing into the defensive block, forcing into designated areas and increasing intensity in the right moments (as they do in the example below). When pressing traps starting from the middle third of the pitch work, they can be quite dangerous on the counter.
However, their wide players (Podence and Fortounis) are often overly emotional in their out of possession decision-making and execution. The timing, intensity and selection of their pressing jumps and their careless pressing angles often leave their fullbacks exposed into 1v2 situations and increase the ground-covering demands from the central midfielders, or worse the centre-backs.
The potential structural collapse even by a single player’s decision or lack of intensity can be easily conceived. A player removed from the midfield creates more space in the centre for the opponent to find pockets of space, or if a player is removed from the defense more space can be created in behind the defensive line.
When back-to-back structural collapses happen and the team has to defend multiple emergency situations, a natural sense of doubt is instilled in the team and the overall levels of compactness, especially vertically decrease. The centre-backs then maintain a low defensive line, spaces between the lines become bigger and as mentioned, the pressing intensity and more importantly timing on the first line when the team defends deeper is fairly low. That’s an issue that arises during games and is mostly dependent on the team’s psychological state and management, than a structural/strategical issue from the managerial side.
OLYMPIACOS | In Possession
Known for his direct play and intention to keep the majority action on the opposite half of the field, Mendilibar has limited the risks the team takes in their own half of the field, focusing on direct play down the wings. Most action is focused on the left where left centre-back David Carmo, offers a high end ball-playing package, with a variety of long balls in his strikes, able to spot wide players to feet and in behind with excellent weight. Without a target-man in the squad most long ball efforts are directed into 50–50 balls for the striker El Kaabi into the channel or directly to the feet of left winger Podence (suspended for the first game). There have been alterations between games, with some direct channel balls into the right as well, but effectiveness has been mixed.
In the opposite half and against deeper defensive structures, more players are involved in the play.
Among the 8 Conference League finalists, Olympiakos plays the highest percentage of short (5–15yds) passes (43%) in relation to their total passes.
Either of the two CMs and the central midfielder used as a #10, Andre Horta, can pull wider to the centre-backs and start the attack, pushing the fullback higher. With Podence on the pitch, Olympiakos can look for more line-breaks on that side, his communication with Horta is quite efficient and with the central midfielder Chiquinho, who is mobile, with good first touch and vertical thinking they create a sub-group that’s balanced and adaptable in terms of control and penetration.
Podence will be a big miss in the first game, as he offers a unique 1v1 skillset, can accelerate/decelerate without losing control and create for himself and teammates with unpredictable timing in his strikes both when crossing and shooting.
Together with the left-back Ortega, the four of them rotate fluidly, combine in tight areas and create space for crossing opportunities. In longer, sustained attacks, traditional #10 employed as right winger, Kostas Fortounis can join to overload as well. Fortounis likes to move outside the opposition shape to find space to play facing forwards, carry dynamically or use his passing range to switch play. Against sides whose frontline struggles to maintain a certain level of aggressiveness in their own half, Olympiakos’ players are quite good at adjusting and finding creative solutions to reach the last part of the pitch.
Olympiacos’ attacking style of play is heavily dictated by individual tendencies, relying on wing play and individual on-ball quality.
As opposed to their patient circulation around the block in the middle third, their chance creation process is fairly direct (as depicted in the fairly low 79% overall pass success rate), with a heavy reliance on crosses to put balls into the box (25% of all balls into the box are crosses), the highest among the 8 finalists.
This is particularly evidenced on the high end technically and creatively right-side with Kostas Fortounis and dribbling right-back Rodinei, but from the left as well. Both of them are ball to feet players, who like to play with many touches and receive outside the shape to find direct individual solutions through crossing, through passing or ball-carrying. Striker El Kaabi lurks excellently in the backpost and consistently finds space to finish after crosses. Quite lengthy, agile and can finish off different angles one touch and with the head.
When crossing in the right moments, they are well-coached to pin the opposition back, with many players in the box, one CB and the far-FB 1v1 against their respective markers and can counterpress well. However, the sync of their creative decisions with the team’s structure are key: they can equally make the opponent very uncomfortable and forced to defend a high volume of a variety of dangerous attacks, or leave the team completely out of balance.
Impatience, rushed decisions that ignore basic group play principles like numerical overloads, attacking 2v1/3v3 situations, off-ball runs or # of players in the box were quite common on the 4–1 loss at home against Maccabi Tel Aviv, though in fairness not only from their side. The balance between creativity and tactical e mpathy on that team is key for team’s consistency.
FENERBAHCE | İsmail Kartal
by Birkan Dogan (@nononsenseLB)
Fenerbahçe continue their run in Europe amid all the chaos they have been going through in the domestic competitions recently, from the pitch invasion in Trabzon to the Super Cup dispute with the football federation. They have also suffered a lot from injuries, and things are still not going well for them, as Fred and İsmail Yüksek are injury doubts for the Olympiacos game. Besides, with the pressure of not winning the league title for the last ten years, they are having another close race with their biggest rivals, Galatasaray. Tomorrow will be a tough test for Fenerbahçe with so much going on around them, and it will be interesting to see the head coach İsmail Kartal’s reaction on the pitch.
FENERBAHCE | In Possession
Kartal mostly uses the 4–2–3–1 formation and tries to make use of the quality feet they have upfield in Tadic, Dzeko, Szymanski and Kahveci. In the build-up phase, they usually use their left side more often to take advantage of the strong interaction between Ferdi, Tadic and Fred, who are quite good at creating triangles in wide areas to combine and manipulate the opposition through off-ball movements, dribblings and through balls. This set-up, if executed well, opens up space on the far side for the RW Kahveci to attack the far post and for the RB Osayi-Samuel, who is an excellent sprinter and can exploit the space with his deep runs.
Against a high press, Fenerbahçe build up with the back four staying deep and both holding midfielders in deeper positions to attract pressure to create a larger gap behind the middle block, aiming to use that space through direct passes to #10 and CF or quick combinations through FB, wing player and CM connection. They usually allow Fred to move into the final third in the creation phase and use İsmail Yüksek deeper in rest defense to defend transitions.
Depending on the opposition’s defensive structure, they can use Fred between the middle and the last line from the start to overload that area. He is a key player in the middle for Fenerbahçe with his ability to contribute on both ends, leadership and game intelligence. In his absence, Krunic would start the game, who is more comfortable building up from deeper areas.
It’s worth mentioning Kadıoğlu’s versatility and contribution in the creation phase. He is comfortable playing in the half spaces and switching position with midfielders thanks to his ability to resist pressure, combine in small areas and break the lines through dribbling.
This versatility has helped him create a strong collaboration with Tadic on the left flank, which is one of the main options for Fenerbahçe in the creation phase. Both Tadic and Ferdi are intelligent players and can manipulate the opposition with their off-ball movement and combination plays. Usually, Tadic is in the creator role, linking up or playing through balls to serve his teammates.
Another threat Fenerbahçe possess is Dzeko’s ability to create space in the defensive line, which midfielders can exploit with deep runs, especially Szymanski and Fred. Szymanski is good at reading the game, knows how to use those spaces in behind and also has good instincts around the box to find scoring opportunities.
On the downside, Fenerbahçe can switch off under pressure at times and struggle to execute their build-up game efficiently at those moments, kicking it long needlessly, making simple mistakes and giving away the ball easily. Their front three are not high intensity runner and they play with more athletic and pacey players like Batshuayi and Cengiz upfront along side Szymanski when preferring to play transitions more often.
FENERBAHCE | OUT OF POSSESSION
Fenerbahçe apply deep attacking pressing or high midfield pressing in a 4–2–3–1/ 4–4–2 and focus on blocking combination options and forcing the opposition to play long passes, which they can defend fairly well with two aggressive and physical CBs.
Fener’s two central midfielders, Fred and Yüksek, are good at applying pressure on the ball and covering the ground with intensity. Ismail’s quick reactions in the defensive transitions are important for Fenerbahçe to keep the ball in the opposition’s half when they try to increase the pressure.
The problem begins for Fenerbahçe once they begin to lose their intensity. Fenerbahçe’s front players, except for Szymanski, do not have the endurance and intensity to put pressure on the ball consistently. They neither apply enough pressure on the ball nor stay compact by narrowing the distances at times, which creates big gaps before and behind the last line, allowing the opposition to start feeding the ball into these areas to break the balance of the defense. As seen in the clips, players before the last line move into space to receive the ball and drag defenders out of their line.
Fenerbahçe can also struggle to defend support runs on their right side due to positioning mistakes from Osayi and the players playing in front of him
Besides, Kadıoğlu’s weakness in the air can be targeted as well by physically bigger opponents.
SUMMARY
- It is quite likely that Olympiacos will try to adjust in terms of personnel defensively to matchup Fenerbahce’s strengths on the left. Masouras might move to the right side, while Fortounis can play as a #10 and Horta can move to the left or vice versa. This could keep the side more aggressive and disciplined out of possession, while maintaining the strong combination play dynamics at the left (and Fener’s weaker defensively right side). Masouras can also offer a secondary to El Kaabi threat on the backpost to target Kadioglu with crosses.
- For Fenerbahce, it’s hard to predict how they will line up since multiple players are injury doubts. The holding midfielders’ contribution to help Kadıoglu and Osayi defend Olympiacos’s attacking full backs will be an important factor defensively. On the other hand, it is important for Fenerbahce to keep possession and set the tempo as much as they can to not allow Olympicos to lock the game in their half. Their use of the wing backs, Kadıoglu and Osayi, will also be important to target Olympiacos’s defensive problems on the sides.
- Overall, matchups between two sides that fail to put enough pressure on the ball in their mid block can always end up being chaotic. Unless they show more intensity and commitment on that aspect to turn the odds in their favour, both teams have the individual quality to create game-changing moments.
