Weaknesses in Georgia’s 5–3–2 Out of Possession
Georgia is one game away from their first appearance in a major international competition and a big part of their success so far has been the defensive foundation of the 5–3–2. Here I’ll break down their behaviour out of possession, weaknesses in their performance and how Greece might look to attack against it in tonight’s qualification playoff final.
All 3 of Georgia’s last opponents (Scotland, Spain, Luxembourg) used a 4–3–3 starting structure (though with different build-out variations) — a starting structure similar to Greece’s. So it’s easier to imagine how this matchup can potentially play out tactically and use relevant examples.
CLOSING THE #6 — USING THE #6
Not engaging until the half-way line (and at times their own third), the front-two of Georgia mostly focus central passing lanes and denying early access to the opponent’s defensive midfielder, while forcing the play out wide. Rarely engaging against 2 centre-backs, opponents rarely opt to drop a player between the CBs and prefer keeping a player higher between the lines, or in front of the CBs to provide support from side to side.
Quoting Martin Rafelt and this great thread — preview of last season’s Champions League Final, the 5–3–2 is “easy to circulate against, but difficult to get any effective progression”. Though the front-two’s work might seem to the outside viewer a bit bland, with low, at best medium intensity, their efficiency at closing down access to the #6 either from the front or from the sides is integral. It forces the opposition to switch play from the CBs, with more passes and slower tempo and as a result the three CMs have more time to shift from side to side to (a) apply higher pressure on the ball in wide areas which is where Georgia want to ball to be played at trap the opponent at the sideline and (b) close passing lanes to the centre.
This low intensity but vital and demanding work from the strikers can be mentally exhausting to pull of for long spells and especially for players like Mikautadze and Kvaratskhelia who are highly technical ball-players whose first instinct is to attack. As they occasionally switch off in the defensive half, opponents can often create openings when finding the relay out to in pass to the #6. The opponent’s #6’s technique to receive with a forward first mentality is important as well, as noticed in the below differences in two similar-ish situations from the Scotland — Georgia game — one of which resulted to a backpass to the CBs and one to an equaliser with the start of the second half.
Similarly, we can see from Georgia’s game against Luxembourg a situation where the #6 didn’t offer to receive centrally when the ball was played out wide and a potential to create an advantageous possession on the far-side, ended up to a new possession from the back and a comfortable shift for Georgia.
Allowing easy circulation, but making effective penetration difficult is one aspect of the 5–3–2. Another benefit of using this system is that the back3 allows the CBs to track opponents between the lines and apply immediate pressure from behind. This way even if the 3 players in midfield fail to close the passing lanes effectively, there will always be pressure on the ball in key zones without risking leaving spaces in behind too much and the opponent can be forced backwards.
MID PRESS OPENINGS: CBs MOBILITY —CMs MOVING LATERALLY AND CLOSING PASSING LANES
However, it requires not only a high level of communication and timing, but also agility from the CBs to change direction quickly and anticipate these situations early. Apart from a few situations close to the penalty area, Georgia’s CBs often fail to follow the team’s aggressiveness in mid press situations and open passing lanes can create direct openings to the the penalty area with a quick combo. In this instance, Scotland found the opening, but failed to get into the box because of the technical execution.
This is not only a weakness of the CBs, but also of the collective to read pressing triggers well and move as a whole both vertically (to make distances between the lines smaller — but risking spaces in behind) and horizontally (to keep a numerical advantage against the opponent on the ball-zone, lock him to the side and reduce each player’s zone of coverage).
Especially the lateral shift of the central midfielders from the right to the left can be punished, with Chakvetadze (an attack-minded player) at the LCM spot lacking the efficiency to screen the defensive line effectively and cover larger spaces. This problem gets enhanced even further by the left wingback Levan Shengelia, whose natural position is that of a winger and this season even plays as a striker in a 5–3–2 system at club level in Greece. His mistimed pressing jumps to apply pressure to the opposition fullback area and overall his closing down technique leaves time to the player in the wide areas (whether it’s the fullback or a midfielder that has rotated down into that position) to find a pass between the lines and dynamic players can the crush the space in behind against immobile CBs.
DEFENDING 3v3 SITUATIONS AND ADDING GREECE INTO THE MIX
How this particular subgroup of LCM-LWB-LCB functions will be particularly important for Georgia against Greece with the additional support of the DM. Gus Poyet’s side relies a lot on fluid rotations on the right side between the RB, RCM and RW. These out to in passes can be particularly heartful for Georgia, as Greece’s RCM, Bakasetas likes to drop into the fullback spot and has the ability to break lines and combine in tight areas with both feet and use both inside/outside of his foot, leading in unpredictable release timings. The chemistry between this sub-group for Greece is quite high and each player’s individual strength fits well with the other’s, often getting runners into valuable crossing spots.
When defending these isolated 3v3 situations in the left in previous games, Georgia struggled to apply high pressure on the ball and lock the opponents to the sideline, but both against Scotland and Luxembourg wasn’t punished off bad technical execution and lacking support from a 4th player that could pin the central centre-back as well, or be the one to make the channel run.
Greece’s usual striker Fotis Ioannidis has the skillset to both offer a hold up outlet and create space for others, but also make diagonal runs when required.
POSITIONAL FREEDOM TO THE FAR-SIDE #8
So far in Gus Poyet’s spell, Greece has found success breaking down 5–3–2 structures against Northern Ireland, Ireland and back5 systems in general (more recently against Kazakhstan). What Gus Poyet and his staff have been good at doing in those matchups is avoiding too much side to side circulation, which is what teams that defend in a 5–3–2 are happy to allow against a rigid positional 4–3–3.
Quite often the difference in these matchups is made by the far-side #8 joining on the ball-side and leaving his “designated space” in systems that prefer an even distribution of the players across space. And in fact, these extra options provided by the far-side by the #8 where the key tactical point of both Scotland’s equaliser against Georgia and Spain’s 2–1, game-state altering goal. Although the Scotland’s LCM position in this sequence can be considered more “positional”, Fabian Ruiz’s movement in Spain’s goal is outside the positional “constraints”.
Albeit not at a very high rate, Poyet hasn’t been reluctant at providing his LCM with more positional freedom to join the right side in the final third, and in fact this has lead to direct output, with a goal against Northern Ireland, but also other dangerous attacks starting from this overload that challenges the opposition wide centre-back.
This option could make the difference in this matchup as well for Greece taking advantage of Georgia’s problem at dealing with overloads on their left, screening out to in passes and having their CBs jump between the lines. Greece’s LCM, Mantalos has the right skillset for the role, being able to initiate attacks from deep, create extra space with his position and movement in small spaces and overall help his control the tempo and find the right moments to attack.
CONCLUSION
5–3–2 vs 4–3–3 matchups are always interesting and require a lot of patience from the team that dominates the ball. Georgia has punched above its weight and was competitive against opponents of higher quality that didn’t find the right solutions until the second half adaptations.
Greece has so far been successful at breaking down sides that set up to defend this way and its strengths fit well into Georgia’s weaknesses. This particular matchup on the qualification final has been expected and prepared from both sides since November and will be curious to see how each team will look to counter the other.
